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RENEGOTIATION OF WAR CONTRACTS
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T

HE limitation of war profits to fair and reasonable levels and the
purchase of war goods at fair prices are essential to the successful
prosecution of the war. These problems come as a part of war and must
be solved just as surely as tactical problems in battle. Exorbitant profits
and prices spell defeat to any nation, for they point the way to inflation
and economic collapse. In modern war the difference between defeat
and victory lies ultimately in the economic strength of the countries
involved. The lessons of history have shown us that no nation can
achieve and maintain its greatest strength and maximum efficiency of
· production without having solved the problems of controlling war
profits and prices.
Although we like to think of America as an exception to all prob·lems, even in our nation war requires many controls not normally
needed in peacetime. We have to accommodate our thinking to these
changes and sometimes it is not easy. But we must remember that war
is not an easy thing and to our mode of life it is not a natural thing.
It brings with it controls and restrictions that normally we do not need.
Every such control and restriction is intended to strengthen America
at war. One of these controls, and one of the most important, is renegotiation, providing for the re-examination of profits and contract
prices so that they may be limited to fair levels.
No one would contend that war c~ntracts ought to yield exorbitant
profits, or that unreasonable profits_ from the manufacture or sale of
war goods ought not be eliminated. Renegotiation puts this concept
into actual practice. It is a flexible procedure for eliminating unreasonable profits from war contracts and assuring the purchase of war
goods at fair prices through a readjustment of prices and profits in
relation· to the circumstances of the individual producer. The renegotiation law is a measure designed to guard our war economy. For by
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limiting profits it repels inflation and it promotes efficiency of production since it is flexible, the efficient producer being rewarded with a
greater amount of profit than the inefficient. An incentive to reduce
costs is thus provided.
NECESSITY FoR CONTROLLING WAR PROFITS

Any inquiry into this problem must commence with the recognition
of certain basic differences between doing business in war and in peacetime. There are factors peculiar to war that make necessary the control
of war profits. Important among these are the elimination of competition, enormously increased volume of production, and inflation.

Competition Is Eliminated During War
Fundamental to our American system of doing business in peacetime was the fact that prices were largely controlled by forces of competition and free enterprise. And we relied upon the same elements
to improve the type and quality of, our commodities. But during this
war we are living in a controlled economy. There is virtually no competition in a price sense. Instead of several million individual and
corporate customers we now have the government as the sole purchaser
for the bulk of our production, buying from producers of varying abilities, as it-must, since all of our industrial resources are needed to prose-·
cute this war successfully.

Quantity Manufactured Has Greatly Increased
Next, we must recognize that the enormous quantity of production
has distorted our normal industrial activity. The quantity of war goods
manufactured has greatly expanded many business~s, so much in fact
that the volume of sales of nearly every manufacturer engaged in war
production has increased far beyond the volume of its peacetime operations. With the expanding volume of sales and the resultant savings
that always follow multiple production, profits have, as a result, reached
large proportions. The increase in our armament program, of course, is tremendous.
Recall the situation at the beginning of the year I 940. We then had an
army of about 165,000 officers and men. Our navy had not fully embarked upon a program to make it of a two-ocean calibre. :Wow we
are engaged in the most titanic struggle in history, equipping an army
of what will probably be I I ,000,000 and a navy of tremendous size.
We are now spending for war alone at the rate of $250,900,000 a day,
and sixty-five per cent of our productive effort is engaged in the prosecution of this war.
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Let it also be remembered that when the war came, contracts had
to be made for many items, most of which we had not produced before
in any quantity and almost none of which had been produced in multiple
quantities. What were fair prices for these items no one could then be
sure. In this situation it is not surprising that mass production of war
implements in an unprecedented quantity should produce substantial
reductions in cost and bring about discrepancies between cost and price.
The result was that profits were created which were beyond the contemplation and intention of either the contractor or the government.
To say this is neither a criticism of the contractor nor of contracting
officers. These profits arose from a situation where the paramount
problem was to get immediate production at a time of national crisis
when little experience in pricing or production was available. Even
now many difficulties arise in war production which make it difficult for
the manufacturer and the government to determine what fair prices
ought to be. Changes in design required by battle experience and the
quantity of production as a shift is made from one type of weapon to
another are impediments to making a firm price that will be reasonable
to both the producer and the government. The recognition of this
situation, of course, demands that measures be taken to eradicate and
prevent excessive profits.
·
Control of War Profits Essential to the Protection of
American Enterprise
Although the overwhelming majority of American business has
clearly demonstrated no desire to make or retain profits that could in
any way be called unconscionable, unfortunately there is a small percentage of those who are out to "get theirs." This group, though very
small, could do incalculable harm to the very legitimate interests of
American enterprise and should not be permitted to make and retain
profits patently unfair. Quite obviously it is to the interest of business
that some limitation and control of war profits be imposed to protect
us all from the indiscretions of these few.
Certainly no business, large or small, can afford during this time
of war to make more than fair profits. The mood of the American
people at war is such that they will not permit one group to benefit
financially beyond the extent of the worth of their contribution, while
others are giving their lives and undergoing great hardships and sacri~
fices. No worse stigma could be affixed to the business community than
that of "profiteer."
There is no question but that American business has done and is
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doing a magnificent job in producing. Moreover, any reasonable appraisal should place the business community high in the public regard
for its inventive and manufacturing achievements. It is extremely important that business do nothing which would in any way distort this
appraisal. No surer way could be found to lower the esteem of business
in the minds of the American people than that business make unconscionable profits out of this war.
Business men, realizing the importance of these facts and appreciating that· our very system of free enterprise and competition will be
jeopardized by excesses on the part of business through making or
retaining unreasonable profits, have undertaken the most thorough and
complete scrutiny of their costs and prices, not only from the point of
returning that which they should not have made, in the light of subsequent experience, but also with a forward view to prevent the realization of inordinate profits in the future.
·
A Preventive against Inflation
Inflation is one of the greatest problems con{ronting any nation at
war. With the checks of competition removed, enormously increased
expenditures in time of war invariably set loose forces that drive prices
upward; and that, if uncontrolled, will destroy the whole order of our .
economy. Where the bulk of our economic resources are devoted to
war and the greatest expenditures are fl.owing into war industry, every
effort must be made fo reduce those expenditures in order to prevent
inflation.
No group of Americans should be more insistent upon the success
of the principle of renegotiation and reducing the cost of the war than
American business. This group will pay the most in taxes to support
the war.
Taxes Will Not Prevent Inflation
Taxes will prevent neither inflation nor unreasonable profits. It
has been contended that taxes will siphon off the bulk of all earnings
and will serve as a prohibition both against inflation and exorbitant
profits, and therefore no additional controls are necessary. Such an
argument is demonstrably unsound. It may be said in fact, that an
eighty per cent excess profits tax is, by itself, inflationary. It accelerates
the inflationary trend because it urges the manufacturer to increase
his prices in order to pay his taxes.
An excess profits tax witholJ.t an additional curb on profits will not
solve the problem, but will only accentuate it. The excess profits taxes
will not reduce costs. Nor will they give the producer any incentive
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to reduce costs. The contrary is frequently true. For realizing that he
must pay eighty cents of every dollar in taxes the producer begins to
think in terms of twenty cent dollars. He makes expenditures that
otherwise would not have been made, and costs rise. Prices then also
rise. The excess profits tax is essential in a war economy, but if exorbitant profits are to be eliminated and inflation checked, something more
is required by way of an additional control. The experience of every
country at war today and in the last war has proved this to be true
beyond doubt.
Robert Patterson, the Under Secretary of War, said recently 1 that
between June, 1940, when France fell and Pearl Harbor, the armed
services contracted for approximately $65,000,000,000 of war contracts. Appropriations for the war now total $240,000,000,000. The
cost of participation in World War I was $21,850,000,000. We know
that during the first world war under a $22,000,000,000 war program,
some companies made exorbitant profits. Under a $240,000,000,000
program as currently appropriated, if profits expand without limitation,
resulting inflation would wreck the American system of economy beyond repair.
Recognizing the changes wrought by the war, we should consider
whether profits are reasonable or unreasonable against the background
of war economy in which .they were created. This is really the core of
the problem. We are not living in a peacetime economy of free enterprise and competition. Profits are not arising under peacetime conditions, but during war. To understand renegotiation we ought to key
our thinking to these facts.
PROFIT CONTROL THROUGH RENEGOTIATION

The alternative means of profit limitation rest primarily as between
a renegotiation procedure which was enacted by the Congress as section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation
Act, 1942,2 and amended by section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942,3
by section 1 of the Act of July 1, 1943,4 and by the Act of July r4,
5
1943, and a fixed percentage of profit limitation act such as was originally contemplated by Congress. 6
1

Patterson, "Renegotiation," DuN's REvrnw, January, 1943, p. 8 at 12.
Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), approved April 28, 1942.
8
Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), approved Oct. 21, 1942.
4
Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., Ist sess. (1943).
5
Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1943).
6 The Case Amendment, H. R. 6868, 77th Cong., 2d sess. ( I 942).
2
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The War and Navy Departments, having the responsibility for the
procurement of armament, made a thorough study of the problem involved in profit limitation control and opposed a fixed percentage of
profit limitation act. The Army and Navy believed that such a statute
would impair production and would not satisfactorily solve this problem which is so vital to attaining maximum production by inducing
·efficiency in operation and reducing cost. A fixed percentage of profit
limitation act would not provide for the recognition of the differences
in skill, amount of capital or turnover in production and the effectiveness of operations as between various producers, nor could it provide
for a different profit allowance to the contractor who had used his own
facilities and financed his own operations as opposed to the one who
had not, and hence could not be applied fairly to all manufacturers.
It seems quite apparent that the position of the War and Navy
Departments in opposing a fixed percentage of profit limitation act is
entirely wise. Congress adopted these views and turned to the enactment of the Renegotiation Act. Through this statute Congress has imposed upon the War, Navy and Treasury Departments, the Maritime
Commission, and the four subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation-Defense Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company,
Defense Supplies Corporation and Rubber Reserve Company 7-the
duty of eliminating any unreasonable profits yielded by war contracts
and subcontracts.
7
The Renegotiation Act as originally enacted, § 403 of the Sixth Supplemental
National Defense Appropriation Act, I 942, was effective only in relation to contracts,
with the War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission. Sec. 403 was
amended by § 801 of Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., Oct. 21, 1942, effective as of April
28, 1942, to include contracts with the Treasury Department. The other parts of this
amendment were largely of a clarifying nature. Later, by § I of the Act of July 1,
1943, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., 1st sess., § 403 was amended so as to include four
subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation mentioned in the text of this
article. Still more recently the Act of July 14, 1943, Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st
sess., amended the first sentence of § 403 (a) (5) by redefining "subcontracts" to
include:
' " ..• any contract or arrangement ( other than a contract or arrangement between
two contracting parties, one of which parties is found by the Secretary to be a bona fide
executive officer, partner, or full-time employee of the other contracting party),
,
"(A) any amount payable under which is contingent upon the procm:ement of a
contract or contracts with a Department or of a subcontract or subcontracts thereunder,
or determined with reference to the amount of such a contract or subcontract or such
contract or subcontracts, or
"(B) under which any part of the services performed or to be performed consist
of the soliciting, attempting to procure, or procuring a contract or contracts with a
Department or a subcontract or su_bcontracts thereunder."
Subsection (c) (6) of § 403 was amended at the same time to make the foregoing amendment applicable where the aggregate sales of such a contract exceed
$25,000 for the fiscal year involved.
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This responsibility has been placed upon these branches of the government because they have the task of procuring arms and supplies for
war. Part of their obligation is to purchase these war goods at fair and
reasonable prices. This responsibility, Congress thought, ought to be
accompanied with the authority to examine profits, since profits, especially in wartime, are not only a reflection of the fairness of prices, but
also have a direct effect upon efficiency and attainment of greatest production. The purpose of the Renegotiation Act is to place in the hands
of the secretaries of the departments concerned with procurement and
the production of war goods a procedure for limiting profits arising
from the contracts made by these departments through a re-examination of contract prices and a recapture of profits that exceed a fair margin of return. The point at which profits exceed a fair margin is to be
determined by the secretaries of these departments. In this way the
circumstances of each individual case may be separately considered and
fairly applied to the individual producer.
The authority for renegotiation which the act confers upon these
secretaries is broad, for the standard prescribed is one of discretion.
Although the act has been criticized on this ground, it should be recognized th.at renegotiation is really just a normal part of the procurement
activity, and unless a fixed percentage of profit limitation is to be relied
upon, which experience (especially under the Vinson-Trammell Act8 )
had already shown to be unsatisfactory, then the discretionary method
of handling the profit limitation problem through renegotiation must
be used. It is the discretionary feature of this law that is one of its
greatest virtues. There is no requirement or attempt to apply any set
formula or rule to all producers, it being recognized that no fixed rule
could be applied fairly to all manufacturers.
Enabling Provision of the Statute

In all prime and subcontracts in excess of $ rno,ooo which are made
for the departments named, the statute [ subsection (b)] requires the
secretary of each such department to include a renegotiation clause.
This clause provides that the secretary of the department concerned
may require renegotiation of the contract prices at such time as the
profits thereunder can, in the judgment of the secretary, be determined.
The fact that a contract does not include such a clause, however, does
not exempt it from renegotiation, inasmuch as subsection ( c) of the
statute empowers and directs the secretary concerned to eliminate exs Act of March 27, 1934, 48 Stat. L. 503; amended Act of June 25, 1936, 49
Stat. L. 1926, and Act of April 3, 1939, 53 Stat. L. 560; 34 U.S. C. (1940), § 496.
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cessive profits from any contract or subcontract which has been made
thereunder whenever "the profits realized or likely to be realized,
from any contract with such department or from any subcontract thereunder, whether or not made by the contractor, may be excessive ...."
And this provision is applicable to all contracts regardless of whether
they contain a renegotiation clause or not, if the contracts were not
fully paid for by April 28, 1942, and are not exempted under other
provisions of the statute discussed hereafter.
Overall Renegotiation
Although the statute speaks primarily in terms of individual contracts, it empowers the secretary to conduct renegotiation on an overall
basis. By virtue of this authority all of the contracts or subcontracts
of a given contractor may be viewed as a group and need not separately
be renegotiated with regard to individual contract prices. This is the
practice through which renegotiation is being carried forward. Its fairness is evident. For by considering the contracts and subcontracts as a
whole, the contractor is given the opportunity to balance off his losses
and gains during any fiscal year subject to renegotiation.
Authority to Reftx Contract Prices
Included in the statute [ subsection (a) (3)] is this definition: "The
terms 'renegotiate' and 'renegotiation' include the refixing by the Secretary of the Department of the contract price." The Renegotiation
Act is primarily designed to serve a repricing function and through this
provision the secretary is empowered to determine contract prices in
the renegotiation procedure. The aim of the government in this regard
is to accomplish this refixing of prices through elimination of unreasonable profits by agreement witli the contractor involved and not through
any unilateral or arbitrary price-fixing action on the part of the govern, ment's representatives.
PROCEDURE IN RENEGOTIATION

The secretaries exercise their authority in renegotiation through the
various price adjustment boards which have been established in the
War and Navy Departments, Maritime Commission and the Treasury
Department.9
9
The War Shipping Administration has also set up a price adjustment procedure
for renegotiation of contracts. Renegotiation authority has been so recently conferred
-upon Boards of Directors of the Defense Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company,
Defense Supplies Corporation and Rubber Reserve Company, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong.,
Ist sess. (1943), amending § 403 (a), that these agencies have not yet had an opportunity to organize for administering their renegotiation responsibilities.
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The War Department's organization consists of a central board,
the War Department Price Adjustment Board, with headquarters in
Washington, D. C., the prime function of which is that of a policymaking and reviewing agency, and which in and of itself handles very
few cases directly. This board serves the Under Secretary of War, who
has delegated authority to it, authority which the Secretary of War
passed on to the Under Secretary with regard to renegotiation. Functioning on a decentralized basis for the most part are the various
sectional boards established in the Army Air Force Materiel Command
and the Army Service Forces. These price adjustment sections, as they
are known, at the present time have forty-four individual units located
throughout the country, as well as in the national capital. This decentralization was undertaken to facilitate the administration of the statute
for both government and business.
In the Navy Department, the Secretary of the Navy has delegated
his authority, through the Under Secretary of the Navy, to the Navy
Department Price Adjustment Board in Washington. Besides the
Washington board, the Navy has regional boards located in New York,
Chicago and San Francisco.
The renegotiation activities of the Maritime Commission are virtually all conducted in Washington through a price adjustment board,
and the Treasury Department has now established its organization for
renegotiation, which will be largely centralized in Washington, D. C.
These price adjustment boards are composed of men from business
and the professions conversant with business and manufacturing problems. One of the most reassuring things to manufacturers relative to
the fairness of renegotiation should be the extremely high calibre of
personnel which has been chosen to assist in the administration of the
act. These men, without exception, are respected because of their
integrity and ability and they are performing an extremely important
and patriotic function for their country.
Commencement of Renegotiation
The renegotiation of a given contractor is begun by his being
assigned to the department and the particular service within that department with which he does the bulk of his business, either through
prime or subcontracts. To illustrate: If a contractor sells forty per cent
of his particular product to the Ordnance Department, thirty per cent
to the Army Air Forces, twenty per cent to the Navy Department and
ten per cent to the Maritime Commission, he would then be assigned
to the War Department and within the War Department he would be
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assigned to the Ordnance Department. That service would then notify
the contractor of his having been assigned for renegotiation and would
handle the renegotiation for all other services or departments. Thus
the contractor has only one group with which to deal in determining
whether he has realized excessive or unreasonable profits for the fiscal
year in question.
Contracts and Contractors Subject to Renegotiation

The statute makes all sales, directly through prime contracts or
indirectly through subcontracts, to the War, Navy and Treasury Departments, to the Maritime Commission, Defense Plant Corporation,
Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation and Rubber
Reserve Company, completed and paid for after April 28, 1942, the effective date of the statute, subject to its authority. These sales are
called renegotiable. All others are nonrenegotiable.
The term "subcontract" is defined to mean any purchase order or
agreement to perform all or any. part of the work, or to make or furnish
any article, required for the performance of another contract or subcontract. The act makes no distinction between a subcontractor and
what has been known to business as a supplier or material man. They
are all treated in the same way and there is no reason why they should
not be.
The statute also provides that contracts by government departments having renegotiation authority with other government departments or with the states are not subject to renegotiation. Subcontracts
thereunder are also exempt. N onrenegotiable sales also include sales to
other departments of the federal government as well as to state and
municipal governments and local political subdivisions, and to foreign
governments. Sales, sometimes called "civili~n" and "commercial,"
to manufacturers whose products do not ultimately find their way into
contracts with the departments of the federal government having renegotiation authority already mentioned are likewise nonrenegotiable.
This is also true for war contracts completed and fully paid for prior to
April 28, 1942, as previously stated.
At the present time the boards are renegotiating the fiscal years of
assigned contractors ending between December 31, 1941, and June 30,
1943. Renegotiation is proceeding by fiscal years for administrative
reasons. Only the sales within the fiscal year under consideration are
renegotiated, although authority may extend by virtue of the statute
to sales in prior fiscal years for contracts not completed and paid for
on April 28, 1942.
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As already pointed out, renegotiation applies to all sales made to
the four departments named regardless of whether the contracts under
which such sales have been consummated contain clauses providing for
renegotiation. Contractors whose aggregate sales to the four departments do not exceed $100,000 for the fiscal year under renegotiation
are not subject to the statute for that fiscal year. Products of mines,
oil wells and gas wells or other mineral or natural deposits, as well as
timber, which have not been processed or refined beyond the first state
which is suitable for industrial use, are exempted by the statute [ subsection ( i) ( 1 ) (ii) ] ; and through the authority conferred upon the
secretaries thereunder, they have issued joint regulations which define
and apply this exemption.
Information to be Furnished
After the contractor has been assigned for renegotiation, he is invited to submit to the board handling the renegotiation of his contracts
information which will have a bearing on the fairness of his earnings.
Information ordinarily requested will include the contractor's detailed
balance sheets for the fiscal years ended in 1936 to 1942. Operating
statements for those years are generally asked for, together with the
statement for the year tinder renegotiation showing a breakdown between renegotiable and nonrenegotiable business for that period. An
analysis of surplus and balance sheets as of the latest available-date,
as well as an operating statement of the contractor, are normally desired. The bases for depreciation and amortization to indicate the policies followed by the contractor in these matters should be furnished.
The methods used in the distribution of overhead and the allocation
of sales are normally asked for. A statement of the contractor's normal
business, a list of his war contracts, important price changes with special
emphasis on price reduction, as well as the production record of the
contractor showing his ability to meet delivery schedules, are of paramount inportance. A statement as to capital and facilities supplied by
the government for renegotiable business, as well as a statement showing that which has been furnished by the contractor, is to be furnished.
The salaries of executives must also be supplied. If these appear to be
exorbitant or excessive, they are disallowed as deductible items in the
consideration of the company's earnings. Special contributions which
a contractor has made in war production, development of technique and
making it available to the government and other contractors, including
patents developed, free licensing of patents owned, and other things
indicating the contributions which the contractor has made to the war-

12

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

are of great consequence. Audits are not conducted except in very unusual cases. The contractor must prepare this material and he will do
well if he does so with care and with a view to presenting all the available information to the price adjustment board in such a way that it
will be helpful and best reflect his particular circumstances.
Negotiating an Agreement

After this information is submitted to the price adjustment board
it is thoroughly studied and analyzed. The contractor is asked to discuss any settlement which may be indicated from a study of these facts.
He is invited to present any additional evidence he may have that will
shed further light upon the fairness of his earnings, and every oppor- tunity is granted to the contractor to demonstrate why his profits should
not be subject to limitation,, if he chooses to take such a position. Contractors are normally aware of earnings that are more than reasonable
and are frankly desirous of making a return which will bring their earnings down to a fair level.
The procedure as between the board and the contractor is one of
negotiation aimed at eliminating any profits found to be unreasonable or
excessive through agreement. The settlement agre~d upon, whether
calling for the return of excessive profits or clearing the company's
business for the fiscal year under consideration, is then embodied in a
contract. After the contract has been executed on behalf of the company, it is then sent to the proper representative to whom the secretary
of the department handling the renegotiation has delegated his authority with regard to ·such matters, for execution on behalf of the government. Such agreements, when executed by both parties, become
final for the fiscal year under consideration and are not subject to being
opened for further consideration except in those cases where the settlement has been made upon estimated figures where actual figures are
not available and the actual earnings of the company are substantially
different than those estimated. Aside from this factor, the agreement
is subject to being reopened only for reasons of fraud or misrepresentation. It is now the case that the secretary of the department dealing
with the contractor's renegotiation has the authority to sign a final
agreement for all the other departments concerned, and therefore the
closing agreement, whether it be for a return of profits or constituting
a clearance, need be submitted only to the secretary of the department
which has conducted the renegotiation.
The fact that a contractor agrees to return money to the government does not brand him as a profiteer in any sense of the word. The
simple fact of the matter is, that in the situation in which war profits

1 943}

wAR CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION

13

are made, it is unlikely that any company can determine, with any high
degree of exactitude, what its earnings will be under its government
contracts. Therefore, renegotiation should be thought of as a normal
procedure wherein a contractor will meet with the government's representatives to arrange for a return of profits that are beyond those which
may be termed reasonable.

How Refunds and Reductions are Made
The statute provides that excessive profits realized through sales
to the departments of the government already mentioned may be
made in these ways: First, the contractor or subcontractor may make a
cash refund to the government. If he does, his prime contract prices
will not be adjusted to provide for the recapture. Second, he may
reduce the contract prices on future deliveries under fixed-price contracts for deliveries that are to be made within the fiscal year under
contemplation. Third, if he is a subcontractor he may so reduce his
prices to any prime contractor with the provision that the prime contractor shall pass on the equivalent benefit to the government in a
corresponding reduction in the prices of its prime contracts or through
a direct cash refund to the government. Fourth, excessive pr.ofits may
be eliminated through any combination of these methods.
Statute of Limitations
One of the objections to the statute as originally enacted was that
it contained no time limitation provisions that were satisfactory. Therefore in the October amendments, subsection ( c) ( 6) was inserted to
prohibit the renegotiation of any contract unless the procedure was
commenced within one year after the close of the fiscal year in which
the contract or subcontract was completed or terminated. Moreover,
under these amendments, the contractor or subcontractor can file financial statements with the secretaries of the departments concerned for
any prior fiscal year or years, and thereafter unless the secretary of
each department gives notice of renegotiation within one year after
the date of the filing and commences the actual renegotiation within
sixty days thereafter, the contractor or subcontractor will not be subject
to renegotiation for the fiscal year or years covered by the statements.
A joint regulation of the secretaries promulgated as of February r,
1943, prescribes the form in which the financial statements of the
contractor or subcontractor should be filed. 10
10

Joint Regulation prescribing the form for Filing of Financial Data by
contractors and subcontractors as provided by subsection (c) (5) of § 403, as amended
by § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, dated February 1, 1943.
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FacToRs CoNSIDERED IN DETERMINING FAIRNESS OF PROFITS

Certainly no problem has been the subject of greater speculation
and more misinformation than the methods used by the price adjustment boards and the factors considered in determining what are and
what are not excessive or unreasonable profits.
There Is No Formula

At the outset it ought to be understood by everyone that there is
no formula to be applied in determining what are unreasonable profits.
, Jn considering the profits which a contractor has acquired from his
renegotiable business, the boards are looking in each instance for a
yardstick which will guide ·them with reference to th.e particular case
at hand. Each case is considered separately, for the problems of each
contractor are different and deserve separate treatment. The contribution which each contractor has made by way of efficiency in production and the assumption of risk is most certainly found to be different.
Nevertheless certain general principles have evolved and may be
stated as those which are helpful to the boards in arriving at their
conclusions.
·
.
In general, the factors considered by the board in determining the
fairness of a contractor's profit fall into two groups: (I) The efficiency
with which the contractor has performed his war contracts; and ( 2)
the risk which he has undertaken in the performance. The board will
also look to the contractor's peacetime earnings or "base period."
Renegotiation and Efficiency
Reward and Inducement. The great justification for renegotiation
is that it provides a means for inducing efficiency in production by
bringing about lower. costs in the manufacture of war goods. Those
charged with the administration of this statute appreciate that there
must be inducements for lowering costs and increasing production.
The successful prosecution of the war demands this. Reward for
efficiency is no idle precept. It is the practice in renegotiation.
If a contractor is making his money because of low costs and in
spite of low prices, and not because of high prices, he is entitled to a
greater allowance of profit than the contractor whose profits are reaped
as the result of high prices.
There could be justification for allowing the additional profit to
the low price, low cost producer, but it is difficult to allow the retention
of the considerable profits in the instance of the contractor who makes
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it not because of his low prices and low costs but because he gets more
for his product than do other producers.
It has been said that there is a lot of ballyhoo about rewarding
efficiency; that the boards are merely paying lip service to the idea and
not actually following it. The fact of the matter is, however, that the
boards in renegotiating the contractor give the closest attention to the
efficiency of his production and, if found to be efficient, he is rewarded
with an additional amount of profit in comparison to the inefficient
entrepr~neur.
Test of Efficiency. We know that normally the efficient producer
is the one who produces the greatest number of units at the lowest cost.
This is no less true in time of war. Low cost and efficiency are directly
related to attaining maximu'm production, an essential goal in time
of war wherein there is a shortage of manpower and materials. It is
difficult for many Americans to accustom themselves to thinking in
terms of other than inexhaustible supplies of men and raw materials.
Yet we know full well now that without the most efficient use of both
of these items we can never hope to attain maximum production. Then
to put it another way, the most efficient producer is the one who, with
the least cost, gets the most production out of every square foot of
floor space, every man-hour, and every machine-hour and who at
the same time husbands the use of critical materials. This is the test
of efficiency in renegotiation as it properly should be.
High Prices and Effective Production. Through the application of
these principles, renegotiation is aimed at attaining greater efficiency
of production and maximum output. High prices cannot be relied upon
to achieve these ends. The opposite is true. The fact is thoroughly
demonstrated by industrial experience that where the margin between
price and cost becomes substantial the producer no longer has the
incentive to keep his costs down and obtain an additional profit through
an additional output. For example: A contractor manufactures shells
for which he is paid $8.oo a unit. This price was calculated upon a
daily production of 4,000 shells. On this basis it costs this producer
$7.60 to make each shell. During 1942 he manufactured 1,500,000
such shells. His profit in this operation was $600,000. This producer
is considered an efficient operator and has attained his rate of production through effective use of men and materials. However, if this
manufacturer had had a greater margin of profit within which to
operate, there would have been, no incentive to keep cost down and
there would be no incentive to increase production. Only through
increasing efficiency and lowering costs can this manufacturer increase
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his profits. Certainly renegotiation, by rewarding efficiency with an
additional amount of profit, gives added impetus to the incentive to
conserve and to manufacture with the least cost. Waste at any time is
bad business. In wartime it is intolerable.
Price and Production Record. The board will place a special
emphasis on the contractor's price and production record. It well
reflects his efficiency and effectiveness. The fact that a contractor's '
overall profits are being renegotiated, rather than the prices or profits
of individual contracts, makes it none the less true that the boards are
in reality inquiring into the fairness of prices in relation to cost. The
-approach taken, of course, is a short cut. If the profits realized are
exorbitant, prices are too high and ought to be reduced. Many contractors have been able to effect cost reductions through increased
volume, various efficiencies in operation and inventive genius. They
then have passed these savings on to the government by way of refunds
-and price reductions. The price reduction record of any contractor is
an item of paramount consideration to the renegotiation boards.
Additional Considerations. Other points of efficiency considered
are the contractor's ability to meet production schedules, his inventive
genius and his co-operation with the government and other contractors
in making available those contributions. The quality of the contractor's
production is given weight as well.

Risk Assumed
In determining whether a contractor's profits are reasonable or not,
the price adjustment boards are also looking to the risk being assumed
by the contractor in the production of war goods. The major items
which reflect the contractor's risk and usually merit the consideration
of the board are these:
( r) The complexity of the manufacturing technique-especially where the contractor is manufacturing an item with which
he has had no previous experience.
( 2) Has operating capital been supplied by the government
or by the contractor?
(3) Were facilities for manufacture furnished by the government or are they the contractor's?
( 4) Cancellation charges which the contractor has had to bear
as a result of war business.
( 5) Increase in the cost of materials and wages.
( 6) Delay in production because of inability to obtain raw
materials for war goods.
( 7) Turnover and delivery rate.
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Balanced against these risks, especially with reference to the increase in cost of materials and charges for cancellation, is the question
whether the contractor's contracts contain escalator clauses and favorable termination clauses.
Risk and Subcontracting
Although subcontracting is to be encouraged as part of the effort
to make use of all facilities in the production of war materials, it is
important to notice whether the contractor is merely an assembler of
fabricated materials in performing his government contracts. It is
normally true that where the contractor does not have to assume
essentially the whole risk of inventory and manufacturing, he is not
entitled to as high a percentage of profit as is the fully integrated
company which undertakes the manufacture and fabrication in its own
plant. There are exceptions, of course. Take for example the contractor who found it necessary to subcontract many of the parts going
into the production of tanks. Because he was unable to find sources
of production that were normally reliable, this particular contractor
had to purchase the inventory and have it shipped to the subcontractors'
plants. And he had to maintain a staff of supervisors in each of the
subcontractors' plants so as to supervise and instruct in the mode of
production required for the items under contract. The risk involved in
these instances, of course, is enhanc_ed.
The elements of efficiency and risk are applied to measure the·
fairness of the contractor's profits, and it is recognized by the boards.
that the contractor whose margin of profit is comparatively smaller-than that of other manufacturers of the same or similar items has
assumed a greater risk .than the contractor with a large profit margin.
Base Period

In constructing a yardstick by which to measure the fairness of a
contractor's war profits, if the contractor's manufacturing operations
in relation to his renegotiable business are the same or similar to those
of his peacetime business, the board will also look to the contractor's
base period of earnings, as it is known,. which is normally to be found
in the average earnings of the years 1936 to 1940. The contractor's
earning ability in a competitive economy is ordinarily thought to be a
reasonably accurate guide of what constitutes fair profits for his particular company. The period of 1936 to 1940 has been selected as a
base because it contains some good and some bad years for business
generally and reflects the company's earning capacity in a peacetime
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period. Moreover, unless some attention is paid to prewar earning
years, the war may become a windfall to many producers, and it is not
desirable that this should be permitted.
There are times when tlie period 1936 to 1940 is such an inadequate representation of the contractor's competitive earning ability
that it must be abandoned as any measurement of fair earnings and
other guides sought. Take this case for example. The "A" Company,
in the year 1936, acquired the "B" Company, a bankrupt enterprise.
The normal sales volume of the "A" Company had been $10,000,000
yearly for the four years prior to 1936. In 1936, following the
acquisition of the "B" Company, the "A" Company proceeded to pour
its earnings into a program to rehabilitate what had been the "B"
Company. This continued through 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940. In
1940 and l 94r, as the result of the management's effort and money.
used by the "A" Company ,in restoring its acquisition, the company's
total volume reached $25,000,000. The profits for the "A" Company
during the course of the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940 were
negligible because its earnings had been used in this acquisition program. In I 941 its production had more than doubled in size and its
profits in relation to the period 1936 to 1940 were, of course, enormously increased. Certainly this is an instance where a different kind of
base period would be selected as a guide for determining whether the
profits realized by the company have been unreasonable or not.
The percentage of return in relation to invested capital, thqugh
not normally relied upon as a satisfactory element in building up the
yardstick to measure profits, is sometiip.es used in these unusual instances. Comparisons "with the other co.mpanies in the same industry
are also helpful. Perhaps some other period in the company's earning
history will be employed as the base period, or a combination of
methods, such as the circumstances may justify, may be used. Of
course, as stated before, earnings in the base period are chiefly useful
as· a guide in those instances where the operations of the company in
this war are very similar to the kind of manufacturing operations
undertaken by the contractor during peacetime. In the instance of the
wallpaper manufacturer, who is now making five hundred pound
bombs, the experience of the contractor's earnings as a wallpaper
manufacturer would not be very helpful in determining what a fair
return should be for his manufacturing bombs.
The fact that a contractor's historical earnings may be found to
constitute a basis for measuring_ the fairness of his present profit is
not intended to lead one to the conclusion that the contractor is entitled
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to the same margin of profit during war as he received during the
prewar period. It has already been pointed out that the conditions of
doing business in wartime are vastly different from those of peacetime
operations, and the boards, in renegotiation, must give this due weight.
PRINCIPLES GovERNING RENEGOTIATION

There are a certain few but important principles which govern the
operations of the price adjustment boards. First, profits are considered
before taxes. Second, a poor working capital position does not indicate
that the company's war profits are reasonable. Third, smaller rates of
profit are justified by larger volumes of production. Fourth, the government is not buying merchandising ability but production ability
and there is less "sales effort" involved in selling to the government
than in sales to individual and corporate customers. Fifth, profit in
relation to sales is the consideration which the boards look to rather
than profit in relation to net worth, inasmuch as the renegotiation
function concerns itself directly with procurement. All of these factors
except the first and second have been discussed heretofore. Let us now
turn to the reasons why the boards are concerned with profit before
taxes rather than after.
Profits Are Considered Before Taxes
It is only natural that the contractor should look at his earnings
after taxes, for he is concerned with the amount that is ultimately left
after all payments are made, whether for renegotiation, taxes, expenses
or otherwise. It is quite clear, however, that the renegotiation boards
must consider the contractor's earnings before taxes. In the first place
it is necessary that the earnings of a company be approached in renegotiation from the point of view of determining how much the company should not have earned. The amount determined under
renegotiation to be returned is actually money that the company should
not, in the view of the renegotiation boards, have received in the first
place. Therefore, if a company's sales are $30,000,000 and a $5,000,000 refund is determined to be made, properly regarded the company's
sales should have been $25,000,000 instead of $30,000,000. And by
like token, if before renegotiation and 'before taxes the company's
profits were $8,000,000, its proper profit is now $3,000,000. If this
approach were not taken and an allowance made for taxes the net effect
would be to defeat the purposes of renegotiation by permitting an extra
profit for payment of the contractor's taxes. Certainly it was not
within the contemplation of Congress that any such result should be
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achieved. Congress has determined in the revenue laws what the tax
contribution should be, and renegotiation cannot be permitted to be so
administered as to defeat the tax laws.

Working Capital Position
The fact that a company may be in a poor working capital position
does not indicate the presence or absence of fair profits and the renegotiation boards are not vested with the function of making available
to overextended contractors capital . for financing production. The
policy in this regard is quite clear. The government has established
sources of capital for the financing of war projects, such as V-loans, ·
R.F.C. loans, Defense Plant Corporation facilities and advance payments.
'
Thinking In Percentages
In the consideration of renegotiation there has been a great deal
of talk about percentages of profits which should or should not be
allowed under given circumstances. This type of thinking has been
confusing and is not conducive to a logical consideration of the problem.
If the approach of the boards were purely from the point of -view
of the percentage of profit to be earned in relation to net sales or even
in relation to capital invested or net worth, the result would be completely illogical inasmuch as the percentage of profit point of view
does not allow for volume. The approach in renegotiation is and
should be an approach from the point of view of determining how
much the contractor's volume is in dollars and how much a fair profit
is in dollars and not percentagewise. This is·worth remembering, and
the contractor who bears this idea in mind will approach his own
problems in a much sounder way and will be able to make a much
clearer presentation of his case and the circumstances of his business
to the renegotiation boards.
TAx EFFECT OF RENEGOTIATION

Taxes are now being paid on 1942 earnings and since those same
profits are now being renegotiated, contractors are especially interested
in the treatment which their tax payments will receive in renegotiation.
Section 3806 of the Internal Revenue Code 11 specifically provides that,
if the contractor has filed his return for a given taxable year now being
renegotiated, the amount by which the contractor's federal income and
11

As amended by Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), § 508.
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excess profits taxes would be decreased for such taxable year by any
profits that the board finds should be returned as being unreasonable
shall be a credit against such profits.
If the contractor has not filed his return for the year under renegotiation, any amount agreed upon to be returned him in the renegotiation proceedings will be deducted from net sales and from profit
and the taxes will be levied upon the amount remaining.
If taxes have been paid, the problem has been raised as to whether
there will be an adjustment on the amount of the postwar refund that
will be due to the contractor. There will be such an adjustment so
that the postwar refund to the contractor will be no different whether
he h~ paid his taxes before renegotiation or afterward. There is,
therefore, no advantage taxwise or otherwise in delaying the renegotiation procedure.
POLICY WITH REGARD TO ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTIBLE ITEMS

Subsection (3) of section ( c) of the statute provides that the board
shall take into consideration in determining whether profits are
reasonable the "properly applicable exclusions and deductions of the
character which the contractor or subcontractor is allowed under
Chapters I and 2E of the Internal Revenue Code." It is clear, then,
that accelerated amortization as permitted by section I 24 of the Internal Revenue Code,12 under the special amortization provision therein
provided for amortization of war facilities over the sixty months'
period, is permitted.
The fact that the words "properly applicable" were used would
appear to have been employed in the statute with design. And thus in
the instance of losses from prior years, where those losses did not arise
from the performance qf war contracts, it has been determined that
they will not be permitted as deductions or exclusions in the determination of profits in the fiscal year under consideration.
The policy of the renegotiation boards generally is to hold quite
closely to the allowances and deductions that have been normally made
by the Internal Revenue Department in the contractor's own operations. Thus, where the Internal Revenue has permitted an accelerated
depreciation for facilities in view of their increased and actual exhaustion and obsolescence, the renegotiation boards will also make
such an allowance reserve for postwar risk.
12

As amended by Pub. L. 7 5 3, 77th Cong., 2d sess. ( I 942), § I 5 5.
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Reserves for Postwar Rehabilitation
The contractor is permitted to set up reserves for postwar risks only
out of profit. This is not a deductible item under the Internal Revenue
Law and is not considered as such in renegotiation proceedings. This
policy adheres to the position taken by Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Pr0duction "Board, which he outlined in a letter of
March 6th, 1942, to the Under Secretaries of the War and Navy
Departments. That a contractor should _be apprehensive about his
ability to convert from war to peacetime operations is only natural,
especially in view of the experience of the past war. But let it be
remembered that this war is not a pattern of the last one. Contractors
remember the mass dispatch of telegrams terminating contracts. Almost without exception their contracts contained no termination clauses
to protect the contractor. Most contracts made by the federal government in this war have contained a favorabl~ termination clause that
will protect the contractor for his costs and expenditures, as well as
allow him a reasonable profit for the terminated portion of the contract.
Moreover, certain provisions of the _tax statute not present in the
last war will be of assistance to the contractor after this war. The
postwar credit, for exampl~, will be of material aid in many instances_
in a liquidation of the contractor's postwar risk. The ''carry-over"
provisions of sections 23S and p2 of the Internal Revenue Code,18 as
they are known, which provide that the net operating losses of the
first and second preceding taxable years may be taken as a deduction,
as well as the carry-back of net operating losses in subsequent years,
should help many contractors. There are certain difficulti~ in determining whether a reserve should be permitted even if it were the policy
to allow the establishment of reserves as a deductible item in renegotiation. The problems of when the war will end and how much will
be needed by conversion, and the fact that reconversion may never be
required at all, present great practical problems which make the determination of how much reserve should be permitted- extremely difficult.
REMARKS IN CONCLUSION

-. Renegotiation provides a control of excessive profits to the end
that fair profits may be earned, but exorbitant profits will ~e prevented.
It is the fairest and best way to attack the problem of profit limitation.
The statute itself is a war measure, a law of collective security, and
As amended by Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), §§ 105 (e) (3),
150 (e), 153 (a-c).
13
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ought to be regarded as such. -Renegotiation is not a tax law. It has as
its primary aim the stimulation of efficiency and the greatest output of
production. It recognizes the desirability of retaining the profit system
by rewarding contractors in relation to their contributions as reflected
in the efficiency of their performance and the risk which they have
assumed in war production.
Renegotiation is not a thing which industrialists should fear. To
the contrary, the renegotiation procedure is founded upon the very
principles that have made American industry great, namely, the reduction of prices in every instance where volume and industrial
achievement have made possible such reductions. Certainly there is
no re~son why the principles of sound business practice should not be
adopted in accomplishing one of our most difficult wartime problems.
It is perhaps unfortunate that at the outset so much emphasis had
to be placed upon the element of recapture in renegotiation, but the
unusual circumstances which have required such a law must be considered, and in the light of these circumstances, price adjustment, not
only with the foresight that is now available through the experience
of past production of armament, but also by the use of hindsight in
pricing made necessary by the unusual conditions of war which make
necessary constant changes in our production program, should be seen
as a normal procedure of procurement. The renegotiation procedure
aims at fair pricing and it attempts to establish fair prices by reviewing
profits. There is no welshing on contracts by the government through
renegotiation, but the unusual circumstances of war require a review of
profits and prices, and these circumstances must be distinguished from
those of peacetime which make possible the normal ways of doing
business.
Since renegotiation is a pricing procedure, a high degree of uniformity in results is, of course, impossible to achieve. But the same
uniformity that results from the application of an established formula
under the tax laws, for example, is not desirable, and the very lack of
uniformity in the results of renegotiation comes from its flexible nature
and from its application to varying circumstances. That results are
not precisely uniform and vary in dollars and percentages from contractor to contractor demonstrates the application of the statute to the
particular circumstances of each contractor, which is one of the ends
sought through this procedure.
Contractors should approach the problem of renegotiation with
these thoughts in mind and should prepare themselves to answer two
questions. First, how much would they have charged the government
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for the various items that they furnished for war if they had known
at the beginning of the period under renegotiation what their costs
were going to be. Second, they ought to ask themselves what the dollar
volume of their business would have been if it had not been for the
war. The answers to these two questions are fundamental.
Then every contractor should voluntarily examine his prices and
cost with these factors in mind and bring about every reduction and
saving to the government that he can effect. No group has more at
stake in the success of renegotiation and limiting of profits to fair levels
than has the business community. Business is earnestly and patriotically
co-operating with its government to make this, law a success, for its
success is vital to the preservation of the American system.

